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ABSTRACT
While the sovereign debt crisis of the Euro zone raises numerous
economic issues that are broadly discussed in public, it also involves
a large number of legal questions that are, in contrast, rarely talked
about. This is surprising, as the relevant legal implications may
predetermine the outcome of the economic discussions by precluding
certain options. The seventeen member states of the Euro zone and
the European Central Bank are struggling to stabilize the financial
situation of the currency union’s highly indebted members. Legal
challenges result from the fact that the Euro zone is not identical to
the European Union, which is comprised of ten more members than
the Euro zone. Additionally, Euro zone members do not constitute
an institution with legal competencies that would enable them to
enforce emergency measures, as is the case with the European
Union. Instead, the Euro zone’s only modus operandi is intergovernmental cooperation. However, the European Union’s legal
framework draws limits on cooperation that could conflict with the
rescue funds established by Euro zone members. Furthermore, the
European Central Bank has gradually become the main provider of
emergency assistance to indebted countries. It has enacted a number
of non-standard measures whose volume has constantly been
growing. Thus, the increasingly drastic nature of the European
Central Bank’s actions raises the question of whether these
emergency measures infringe upon the Bank’s own mandate.
Finally, the restructuring of Greek sovereign debt in early 2012 has
raised a number of legal issues. The focus of this analysis will be
the legal challenges posed by retroactive Collective Action Clauses,
in particular those presented by the Bilateral Investment Treaties that
Greece has previously signed.

* Dr. iur. habil., Humboldt, University of Berlin; LL.M. New York University; LL.M.
National University of Singapore. Professor of Law, Private University in the
Principality of Liechtenstein (UFL).
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I. UNIQUE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS
A. A CRISIS OF TRUST
The Euro currency union (“Euro zone”) crisis is one of sovereign
debt. It implicates the members of the currency union, seventeen out of
twenty-seven European Union (“EU” or “Union”) member states,
though it is not a currency crisis as of yet. Since its introduction, the
Euro has been a rather stable currency. In the course of the last three
years, however, its exchange rate to other major currencies has
depreciated, though not drastically enough to amount to a currency
crisis. In addition, the inflation rate surpassed the target set by the
European Central Bank (“ECB”) of “below, but close to, 2%” in 2012
and has dropped below it in the first half of 2013.1
This crisis is a result of enormous amounts of debt that have been
accumulated by a number of currency union member states. Investors
question the sustainability of these states’ debt and suspect default, and
as a result require high-risk yields or abstain altogether from investing in
sovereign bonds from those countries. A number of countries have been
cut off from market financing due to this issue. It started with Greece in
May 2010, followed by Ireland later that year and then Portugal in early
2011.2 More recently, Cyprus has joined the group of recipients of
financial aid, and Spain has requested help for its financial sector.3 Italy
is still able to receive market funding but risk premiums have gone up
significantly, prompting the ECB to intervene heavily in the sovereign
bond markets.4
B. THE UNIQUENESS OF THE ISSUE
The current crisis is unique in several respects. For the first time in
post-war history, highly developed countries are on the verge of
1. On Euro area inflation data from April 2012 to April 2013, see News Release,
Eurostat, Euro area annual inflation down to 1.2% (Apr. 30, 2013), available at
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/2-30042013-AP/EN/2-30042013AP-EN.PDF.
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. See infra Part II.A.
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defaulting. In addition, this crisis affects an entire region comprised of
several countries whose future prospects could hardly diverge more.
Four of the currency union members have kept their top ratings
(Germany, Netherlands, Finland and Luxembourg), but the sovereign
debts of the other members have been downgraded, some so
significantly that their sovereign bonds have been referred to as “junk
bonds.”5
In the post-war era, the rules of the Paris and London Club were
sufficient to find solutions for the effects of unsustainable debt and
sovereign defaults on underdeveloped or emerging economies.6 By
assembling the major creditors who would agree on a debt restructuring,
uncontrolled defaults could be avoided. These principles prevailed even
during the Latin American crises of the 1980s and 1990s, though further

5.The lowest ratings were Greece’s CCC, which was lowered to selective default in
early 2012 until the sudden raise to B- on Dec 19, 2012, as well as Portugal’s BB. See
Sovereigns Rating List, STANDARD AND POOR’S RATINGS SERVICES,
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/sovereigns/ratings-list/en/eu/
?subSectorCode=39&start=100&range=50 (last visited Apr. 9, 2013) (providing an
updated list of sovereign ratings by Standard & Poor’s). On the credit rating system in
general, see Roberto A. De Santis, The Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis – Safe Haven,
Credit Rating Agencies and the Spread of the Fever from Greece, Ireland and Portugal
55 tbl.A1 (European Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 1419, 2012), available at
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1419.pdf. The EU is currently reforming its
regulation on credit rating agencies. See Christian Hofmann, Stabilizing the Financial
Sector: EU Financial Services 2010–2012, 8 EUROPEAN REV. CONT. L. [ERCL] 426
(2012) (Ger.).
6. See PARIS CLUB, http://www.clubdeparis.org/en (last visited Apr. 10, 2013)
(“The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors whose role is to find
coordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by debtor
countries. As debtor countries undertake reforms to stabilize and restore their
macroeconomic and financial situation, Paris Club creditors provide an appropriate debt
treatment. Paris Club creditors provide debt treatments to debtor countries in the form
of rescheduling, which is debt relief by postponement or, in the case of concessional
rescheduling, reduction in debt service obligations during a defined period (flow
treatment) or as of a set date (stock treatment).”). The London Club is less
institutionalized. The term stands for a forum of commercial banks in which they
negotiated haircuts for sovereign debtors. On both the Paris and London Clubs, see

Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña y Barroso, Identical Collective Action Clauses for
Different Legal Systems: A European Model, in COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES AND
THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOVEREIGN DEBT 15, 15, 18 (Klaus-Albert Bauer, Andreas
Cahn & Patrick S. Kenadjian eds., 2013).
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efforts were also needed, such as with the introduction of Brady bonds.7
The Argentine crisis marked the beginning of a new level of sovereign
default, as it illustrated that the amount of debt that had been
accumulated by highly industrialized nations eclipsed traditional
methods of managing the default. The discourse that followed did not
produce practical results,8 which is why there are no ready solutions for
responding to the current Euro zone crisis.
This situation is further complicated by the fact that the highly
indebted countries of the EU are part of a currency union. Thus, they
are no longer in control of the policies governing their currency. The
monetary policy is set by the Council of the ECB that consists of
seventeen governors, the heads of the National Central Banks (“NCBs”)
of the member states, and the directorate of the ECB.9 This Council
decides the currency policy of the union by majority vote, with binding
effect on all impacted member states.10 This policy is executed jointly
by the ECB as well as the NCBs that are subject to the ECB’s
instructions.11 As a result, the Euro zone countries are limited in their
responses to the crisis; in addition, the current crisis raises issues that
have never before occurred.
Traditionally, a country with unsustainable debt implements
emergency measures to regain sustainability. The ultimate goal—
notably, economic growth—requires drastic measures to increase a
country’s competitiveness. Such measures include austerity, default,
and restructuring, as well as inflation coupled with depreciation of the

7. See Lee C. Buchheit, How Ecuador Escaped the Brady Bond Trap, INT’L FIN.
L. REV., Dec. 2000, at 17. See also Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 15 (Aug. 4, 2011), available at
http://italaw.com/documents/AbaclatDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf (on the Brady bond
concept).
8. See infra Part III.A. on the plans to establish a resolution regime for sovereigns.
9. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European
Union art. 129(1), Oct 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 103 [hereinafter TFEU]; Protocol on
the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank
Article 9(3), 10(1), March 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 230, 233 [hereinafter Protocol on
the ESCB and the ECB].
10. See Protocol on the ESCB and the ECB, supra note 9, Article 10(2), O.J. (C
83) 233; id. Article 14(3), at 237.
11. See id. Article 7, O.J. (C 83) 232; id. Article 12(1), O.J. (C 83) 236 (on the
independence of the national central banks in national matters). See also TFEU Article
130, 2008 O.J. (C 115) at 106.
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currency.12 Austerity efforts are limited by their recessive effects on the
economy and may even prompt social unrest. Both default and
restructuring send out negative signals to the markets and discourage
potential investors.13 Therefore, monetary depreciation caused by
expansionary monetary policy, potentially coupled with “quantitative
“easing,” seems like the most feasible solution. It may raise the
country’s competitiveness, since low production costs could attract
foreign investments and a weak currency generally boosts exports.
These benefits come with the unavoidable side effect of high inflation,
but any negative effects are mitigated if the debt is denominated in the
local currency.14
Since monetary policy is decided by the ECB, a currency union
member could not enforce such measures on its own. The ECB’s most
efficient instrument to steer inflation and manage the exchange value of
the Euro is its power over the money supply.15 Even if the ECB decided
to depreciate the Euro, it would hardly help the struggling union
members. Most members trade predominantly with other member
countries, leaving their export industry in practically the same position.16
For a member of the currency union, debt within the union is therefore
comparable to debt denominated in a foreign currency (foreign debt).

12. On measures taken by governments in situations of financial distress, see
SOVEREIGN INSOLVENCY STUDY GRP., INT’L LAW ASS’N, STATE INSOLVENCY: OPTIONS
FOR THE WAY FORWARD, THE HAGUE CONFERENCE REPORT 1 (2010). See also Richard
Herring, in: Allen/Gelpern/Mooney/Skeel, Is U.S. Government Debt Different?, 2012,
p. 21, 22.
13. See Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Solving the Financial and Sovereign Debt Crisis
in Europe, OECD JOURNAL: FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS, no. 2, 2011, at 201–05,
available at http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/49481502.pdf (discussing
potential rescue measures for the highly indebted Euro zone countries and their
advantages and disadvantages).
14. See SOVEREIGN INSOLVENCY STUDY GRP., INT’L LAW ASS’N, STATE
INSOLVENCY: OPTIONS FOR THE WAY FORWARD, THE HAGUE CONFERENCE REPORT 1
(2010).
15. See Protocol on the ESCB and ECB, supra note 9, art. 12, 2010 O.J. (C 83) at 5
(decisions regarding the money supply in the union are made by the ECB); Joseph de
Wolf & Dominique Servais, Objectives and Tasks of the Eurosystem and of the
National Central Banks, 2009 EUR. BANKING & FIN. L.J. [EUREDIA] 441, 448 (Belg.)
(discussing the monetary policy and competences of the ECB).
16. See EU Merchandise Trade with Non-EU Countries: Monthly Growth,
EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/statistics/ (last updated Feb. 18, 2013)
(presenting EU trade statistics).
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The measures that can be taken autonomously are drastically limited;
they include default and the search for external help.
II. RESCUE AND STABILIZATION EFFORTS
In response to the limited options of a currency union member
state, the union itself has provided emergency help to ease the pressure
on indebted countries and to protect the interests of the union as whole.
A. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL FINANCIAL FACILITIES
Financial support for Euro zone members faces several legal
obstacles. The most obvious is that it is the EU, not the Euro zone,
which has a legal personality and related organs and institutions.17 The
legal framework of the EU generally does not differentiate between
currency union members and other EU countries.18 The EU is more
factually than legally divided into a group of seventeen currency union
members and ten countries that either chose to keep their national
currencies or have not yet fulfilled the criteria necessary to join the
currency union. Even the ECB is an institution of the EU, and the
European System of Central Banks (“ESCB”) includes the central banks
of all twenty-seven EU Member countries and the ECB.19
The sovereign debt crisis predominantly affects the countries of the
currency union. All highly indebted countries whose debts have been
downgraded and who face serious obstacles to receiving market
financing under sustainable conditions are Euro countries. Furthermore,
the currency union fears for the stability of the Euro, and as a result its
more stable members are also affected. This creates a serious dilemma
for the EU. Drastic emergency measures on the EU level are impeded
17. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 47, May 9,
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 13, 41 [hereinafter TEU].
18. A recent exception is Article 136(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU
(“TFEU”), which addresses only the members of the currency union. See infra Part
II.A.1.c.
19. On the principals of the European System of Central Banks, see generally
Bernd Krauskopf & Christine Steven, The Institutional Framework of the European
System of Central Banks: Legal Issues in the Practice of the First Ten Years of its
Existence, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1143, 1143–75 (2009); see also Francisco Javier
Priego & Fernando Conlledo, The Role of the Decentralisation Principle in the Legal
Construction of the European System of Central Banks, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE
EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS 189, 190 (European Central Bank 2005). For
more detail on the ESCB, see infra Part II.A.
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by the reluctance of non-Euro members to participate.20 The Euro zone
has reacted by cooperating on an inter-governmental level,21 which
creates serious legal complications. Whereas the actions of the EU
institutions can only be challenged by other EU institutions, member
states, or in few exceptional cases by individuals who are directly
affected, a much wider circle of involved parties can take action against
the acts of national governments, such as members of national
parliaments and individuals.22 Germany provides a striking example.
The German Constitutional Court has repeatedly ruled on the
constitutionality of the Euro zone rescue measures provided by
Germany because citizens and members of parliaments are entitled to
turn to that court for a decision on the constitutionality of government
acts.23 Further legal implications of this shift to the intergovernmental
level are discussed in the following paragraphs.

20. See, e.g., Sweden’s Borg Dismisses EU Bank Supervision Plan, THE LOCAL,
http://www.thelocal.se/43258/20120916 (Sept. 16, 2012) (Swed.) (on the Swedish
resistance to the planned Banking Union). See also infra Part II.C.2.
21. See infra Part II.A.–B.
22. See TFEU arts. 251–81, 2012 O.J. (C 263) at 157–67 (determining the
competences of the European Court of Justice). Actions are generally limited to Union
institutions and member states with few exceptions. Id. art. 263. Article 263 enables
individuals to take action against Union measures, but requires that these measures
affect the individual directly. Id. Article 265 enables individuals to demand actions
from Union institutions that are directly addressed to the individual. Id. art. 265.
23. See, e.g., Press Release, German Constitutional Court, Applications for the
Issue of Temporary Injunctions, (Sept. 12, 2012) (Ger.), available at
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg12-067en.html.
Recently, the German Constitutional Court conducted a preliminary hearing on the
compatibility of the obligations arising from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)
with the German constitution. See id. For more on the ESM, see infra Part II.A.1.c. The
court first articulated that, under the standard by which it would review the matter, the
imposition of an incalculable financial obligation on Germany under the ESM Treaty
would violate the budget autonomy of the federal parliament. Press Release, German
Constitutional Court, supra. It ruled that Article 8(5) of the ESM Treaty had to be
understood as limiting the total amount of Germany’s payment obligations to
€ 190,024,800,000, and stated that no provision of the ESM treaty “may be interpreted
in a way that establishes higher payment obligations for the Federal Republic of
Germany without the agreement of the German representative . . . .” Id. Furthermore,
the court obligated Germany to “express that it does not wish to be bound by the ESM
Treaty in its entirety if the reservations made by it should prove to be ineffective.” Id.
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1. Direct Financial Aid
The highly indebted member states receive funding from member
states of the currency union and international organizations. The tools
applied are similar to a corporate restructuring. The indebted country
leaves the markets for a limited time, while public financing helps to
break the vicious cycle of downgrades and higher financing costs.
To date, five countries have profited from direct financial
assistance. In May 2010, Greece became the first country to receive
help from the European Financial Stability Mechanism (“EFSM”), the
IMF, and bilateral loans from currency union member states.24 The
European Financial Stability Facility (“EFSF”) was established shortly
afterwards to help Ireland, Portugal, and later on, Greece.25 In June
2012, Spain joined the group as the fourth recipient of Euro zone
financial aid from the EFSF.26 The fifth beneficiary shortly followed;
Cyprus submitted an official request for financial assistance to the Euro
group on June 25, 2012.27
a. European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM)
The EU established the EFSM in May 2010. An EU regulation
based on TFEU Article 122(2) provides the legal framework.28 TFEU
Article 122(2) regulates the procedure under which the Union can
24. On the financial aid to Greece by the EFSM, see Council Regulation 407/2010,
Establishing a European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, 2010 O.J. (L 118) 1 (EU).
On the EFSM, see Jean-Victor Louis, The No-Bailout Clause and Rescue Packages, 47
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 971, 986 (2010); Deborah Zandstra, The European Sovereign
Debt Crisis and Its Evolving Resolution, 6 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J., 285, 288 (2011). On
the financial aid by the IMF and other Euro member states, see EC Directorate-General
for Economic and Financial Affairs, The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece,
Occasional Papers 61 (May 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
publications/occasional_paper/2010/pdf/ocp61_en.pdf.
25. For an up-to-date summary of the lending operations of the EFSF, see Lending
Operations, EFSF, http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/operations/index.htm (last updated
Feb. 28, 2013).
26. See Spain: Memorandum of Understanding on Financial-Sector Policy
Conditionality (July 20, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_
borrower/mou/2012-07-20-spain-mou_en.pdf.
27. See Frequently Asked Questions, EFSF, § J, http://www.efsf.europa.eu/
attachments/faq_en.pdf (information on future aid can be retrieved from the up-to-date
summary of the lending operations of the EFSF).
28. Council Regulation 407/2010, Establishing a European Financial Stabilisation
Mechanism, 2010 O.J. (L 118) 1 (EU).
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financially assist a member: “[w]here a Member State is in difficulties
or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural
disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control, the Council, on
a proposal from the Commission, may grant, under certain conditions,
Union financial assistance to the Member State concerned.”29 Thus, the
regulation authorizes the EU Commission to collect money from credit
institutions or the financial markets in the name of the Union and to
provide that money to member states that fulfill the regulation’s
requirements.
b. European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)
The financial resources provided by the EFSM are rather
insignificant as compared to the volume of the second source of
financial aid, the EFSF. The EFSF is not a Union facility, and therefore
not based on TFEU Article 122(2). Euro zone member countries
established the EFSF on the basis of an inter-governmental treaty
outside of the EU in June 2010,30 as a corporation established under the
laws of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. It cooperates with the Union
institutions, above all the Commission, which negotiates the financial
aid conditions with the intended recipient in the name of the Euro zone
member states. These member states are also the shareholders of the
corporation.31
According to its articles of incorporation, the EFSF was founded to
“facilitate or provide financing to Member States of the European Union
in financial difficulties whose currency is the Euro and which have
entered into a memorandum of understanding with the European

29.
30.

TFEU art. 122.
See European Financial Stability Facility Framework Agreement (June 7,
2010), available at http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/20111019_efsf_framework_
agreement_en.pdf [hereinafter Framework Agreement]; European Financial Stability
Facility, Statuts Coordonnés Suite à un Constat D'Augmentation de Capital [Articles of
Association Following a Finding of an Increase in Capital] (Dec. 6, 2011), available at
www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/efsf_articles_of_incorporation_en.pdf
[hereinafter
Articles of Incorporation]; see also Zandstra, supra note 24, at 288–90; Sideek
M. Seyad, A Legal Analysis of the European Financial Stability Mechanism, 26 J. INT’L
BANKING L. & REG. 421, 424–26 (2011) (U.K.).
31. See Framework Agreement, supra note 30; Articles of Incorporation, supra
note 30.
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To pursue this
Commission containing policy conditionality.”32
purpose, the EFSF issues bonds with underlying claims that are
guaranteed by the Euro zone member states.33 The individual share in
the guarantees corresponds to the share in the paid-up capital of the
European Central Bank.34 As of May 2013, Germany’s share, about
twenty-nine percent of the debt, is the highest of the member states.35
c. European Stability Mechanism (ESM)
The Euro zone has established a permanent funding scheme called
the European Stability Mechanism (“ESM”). It was supposed to be
effective on July 1, 2012, but the German president delayed its
ratification in Germany to await the German Constitutional Court’s
decision in a preliminary hearing on the compatibility of the obligations
arising from the ESM with the German Constitution. In September
2012, the court decided that allowing Germany to have an incalculable
financial obligation to the ESM would be in violation of the budget
autonomy of the German federal parliament. It ruled that Article 8(5) of
the ESM treaty had to be understood as limiting Germany’s total
payment obligations to € 190,024,800,000 and that no provision of the
ESM treaty “may be interpreted in a way that establishes higher
payment obligations for the Federal Republic of Germany without the
agreement of the German representative . . . .”36 Furthermore, the court
obligated Germany to “express that it does not wish to be bound by the
ESM Treaty in its entirety if the reservations made by it should prove to
be ineffective.”37 The ESM became the EU’s permanent bailout fund
after Germany ratified it on September 27, 2012 and deposited its
instrument of ratification that same day.38
32. Articles of Incorporation, supra note 30, at ch. 1, § 3. The language is
originally from the EFSF Prospectus: EUR 55,000,000,000 Guaranteed Debt Issuance
Programme (Feb. 13, 2012), at 57, available at http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/
efsf_prospectus_dip_55bn_20120213_en.pdf.
33. See Framework Agreement, supra note 30, pmbl., ¶ 2, at 2.
34. However, in October, 2011, Greece, Ireland and Portugal were exempted from
contributing, and, as a result, the shares of the remaining members went up, Germany’s
from 27% to 29%. See Frequently Asked Questions, EFSF, supra note 27, § A3.
35. Id.
36. See Press Release, German Constitutional Court, supra note 23.
37. Id.
38. See Factsheet: European Stability Mechanism, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/en/ecofin/132734.pdf.
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TFEU Article 136 was amended to establish the ESM in paragraph
3, which provides that “[t]he member states whose currency is the euro
may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to
safeguard the stability of the Euro area as a whole.”39 The legal
framework of the ESM is provided in the “Treaty Establishing the
European Stability Mechanism.”40 Like the EFSF, the ESM is
established by an intergovernmental treaty and run by a corporation
whose shareholders are the Euro zone member states, incorporated in
the Grand-duchy of Luxembourg.41
2. Indirect Financial Aid
The EFSF may also provide indirect financial aid, as may the ESM.
The EFSF is entitled to buy sovereign bonds of Euro zone countries for
the purpose of avoiding soaring yields on those bonds, thereby
ultimately preventing default. These purchases may take place in the
secondary and, on an exceptional basis as stated in the EFSF Guideline
on Primary Market Purchases of November 29, 2011, the primary
market.42
In addition, the EFSF can recapitalize credit institutions when a
foreseeable crisis predominantly originates in the financial sector. The
intention of this aid mechanism is reflected in the wording of the
guidelines that explain, “[e]xperience has shown that some governments
may not have large enough resources, especially where the size of the
financial sector is large relative to the size of the economy. In these
cases, the EFSF may serve as the last-resort instrument to preserve
39.
40.

For more detail on this amendment, see Seyad, supra note 30, at 427.
See Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Feb. 2, 2012
[hereinafter ESM Treaty], available at http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/
582311/05-tesm2.en12.pdf (detailing the ESM); EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, MONTHLY
BULLETIN: JULY 2011, at 71-84 (2011) [hereinafter ECB JULY BULLETIN], available at
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/mobu/mb201107en.pdf; Zandstra, supra note 24, at
300; Seyad, supra note 30, at 428.
41. See ESM Treaty, supra note 40, art. 1.
42. See Maximising the Capacity of the EFSF: Terms and Conditions, EFSF (Nov.
29, 2011), http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/efsf_terms_of_reference_
maximising_the_capacity.pdf. See also EFSF Guideline on Primary Market Purchases,
EFSF (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/efsf_guideline_on_
primary_market_purchases.pdf; EFSF Guideline on Interventions in the Secondary
Market, EFSF (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/efsf_guideline_
on_interventions_in_the_secondary_market.pdf.
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financial stability.”43 As a prerequisite for financial aid, the guidelines
require that “[a] beneficiary country will have to demonstrate that it has
a sound fiscal policy record . . . and sufficient capacity to reimburse the
EFSF loan . . . .”44
In the future, a “banking union” may replace EFSF assistance in
national financial sectors. Under these EU plans, supervision over
financial institutions would be transferred from the national authorities
to the European Supervisory Authorities and the ECB.45 The ESM
would gain the necessary power and tools to provide loans to
recapitalize financial institutions throughout the EU.46
These plans are part of the broader agenda to complement the
monetary union with a thorough banking and fiscal union.47 The risks to
individual nations resulting from huge financial institutions operating
from their territories would be eased by the currency union’s joint
liability for the soundness of these institutions.
However, these plans include the entire EU, and therefore the ten
member states that are not part of the Euro zone. Some of these nonEuro zone countries have already voiced their objections to these
plans.48 Furthermore, even the support of the currency union members
seems doubtful. Opposition parties, backbenchers of government
43. See EFSF Guideline on Recapitalisation of Financial Institutions (FIs) via
Loans to Non-programme Countries, EFSF, 2, http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/
efsf_guideline_on_recapitalisation_of_financial_institutions.pdf.
44. Id.
45. See Press Release, European Comm’n, Update – The Banking Union (June 22,
2012), available at europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-478_en.pdf (discussing
the informal European Council of May 23, 2012, where the Commission presented the
idea of a banking union,).
46. For this purpose, the ESM Treaty, supra note 40, art. 3, excerpted below, will
have to be amended:
The purpose of the ESM shall be to mobilise funding and provide stability support
under strict conditionality, appropriate to the financial assistance instrument chosen,
to the benefit of ESM Members which are experiencing, or are threatened by, severe
financing problems, if indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro
area as a whole and of its Member States. For this purpose, the ESM shall be entitled
to raise funds by issuing financial instruments or by entering into financial or other
agreements or arrangements with ESM Members, financial institutions or other third
parties.
47. On the informal European Council of May 23, 2012, the Commission presented

the idea of a banking union. See Press Release, European Comm’n, Update – The
Banking Union (June 22, 2012), available at europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12478_en.pdf.
48. See Sweden’s Borg Dismisses EU’s Bank Supervision Plan, supra note 20
(referring to the Swedish resistance to the planned Banking Union).
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parties, and, above all, voters in the member countries seem increasingly
worried, if not alienated, by the crisis and “crisis management.”49
3. The “No Bail Out” Clause
Apart from the question of political will, there is the legal issue of
whether the current rescue measures violate EU law. These legal
questions have caused much controversy, not only among academics,
but also among the central banks of the ESCB and national politicians in
Euro zone member states. The controversy revolves around the wording
of TFEU Article 125, which may prohibit the EFSF and ESM rescue
measures. TFEU Article 122(2) does not cover the EFSF and ESM
because under the EFSF and ESM agreements, financial aid is not
provided by the EU, but by Euro zone governments, and Article 122(2)
only refers to financial assistance by the EU.50
The text of TFEU Article 125 provides:
(1) The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of
central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other
bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any
Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for
the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not
be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments,
regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by
public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without
prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a
specific project.
(2) The Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the European Parliament, may, as required, specify
definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in
51
Articles 123 and 124 and in this Article.

The key legal issue is whether this ban is limited to the exact
wording of the provision and therefore restricted to the assumption of
commitments, or if a broader reading is required.
The latter

49. See supra Part II.A. The most obvious example seems to be the continuous
efforts of German members of Parliament and other citizens to stop further transfers of
liabilities by appealing to the Federal Constitutional Court.
50. TFEU art. 122(2).
51. TFEU art. 125.
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interpretation would prohibit any measure by the EU or a member state
that provides financial help to another member state.
A contextual interpretation of Article 125 supports the prohibition
of any form of member state bailout. TFEU Arts. 120–126, which
discuss the economic policy of the Union, reflect the market approach
pursued by the TFEU. TFEU Arts. 122(2), 125, and 143 demonstrate
that the Union pursues an approach of independent market financing for
each member state, while TFEU Article 126 further provides strict rules
on fiscal discipline. Financial support for member states is limited to
exceptional cases, which are explicitly regulated in these provisions.52
The counter-argument to this is that the Treaty provides for
emergency measures in general, and an emergency situation such as the
sovereign debt crisis requires adequate measures even if the Treaty did
not foresee them.53 This is certainly true, yet it calls for amendments to
the fundamental principles establishing the currency union. The current
framework may be flawed, but clearly seems to prohibit any form of
financial assistance provided by the union or the member states to other
member states. Long-term financing provided by the EFSF and ESM as
a response to a lack of fiscal discipline undermines the imperatives of
TFEU Article 126, which call for disciplinary measures for member
states that infringe upon the rules, and not financial assistance.54

52.
On all of the above, see Ulrich Häde, Haushaltsdisziplin und Solidarität im
Zeichen der Finanzkrise [Budgetary Discipline and Solidarity in the Financial Crisis],
20 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [EUZW] 399, 403 (2009)
(Ger.); Lothar Knopp, Griechenland-Nothilfe auf dem verfassungsrechtlichen Prüfstand
[Constitutional Scrutiny of the Financial Aid for Greece], 63 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1777, 1779 (2010) (Ger.); Kurt Faßbender, Der europäische
“Stabilisierungsmechanismus” im Lichte von Unionsrecht und deutschem
Verfassungsrecht [The European “Stabilization Mechanism” in the Light of EU Law
and German Constitutional Law], 29 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERWALTUNGSRECHT
[NVWZ] 799, 800 (2010) (Ger.); Ulrich Jan Schröder, Die Griechenlandhilfen im Falle
ihrer Unionsrechtswidrigkeit [The Greek Financial Aid in Case of its Infringement of
Union Law], 64 DIE ÖFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG [DÖV] 61, 62–63 (2011) (Ger.) (a
more expansive reading is mainly taken by German scholars).
53. See Louis, supra note 24, at 985; Christoph Herrmann, Griechische Tragödie –
der währungsverfassungsrechtliche Rahmen für die Rettung, den Austritt oder den
Ausschluss von überschuldeten Staaten aus der Eurozone [Greek Tragedy - The
Currency Constitutional Framework for the Rescue, the Withdrawl or Removal of
Over-Indebted Countries in the Euro zone], 21 EUZW 413, 415 (2010) (Ger.).
54. See infra Part II.C. (discussing similar legal issues resulting from the central
bank measures).
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B. NON-STANDARD CENTRAL BANK MEASURES
The ECB has enacted a number of non-standard monetary
operations in order to support indebted countries and the financial
sector, some in addition to the funding provided by the intergovernmental financial facilities, and some which occurred prior.
1. Liquidity Provided by the Euro System
The Euro system (“System”) consists of the ECB and the NCBs of
the member states, whose currency is the Euro (TFEU Article 282 §§ 1–
2).55 The ECB determines the monetary policy of the currency union,
and the NCBs implement this policy by inter alia providing liquidity to
credit institutions. The NCBs engage with credit institutions in “openmarket operations” that are part of the tasks defined by TFEU Article
127.56 Liquidity is granted in exchange for adequate security as required
by Article 18.1 of the Protocol on the ESCB and the ECB Statute.57
Via a repurchase agreement, ownership of an asset is transferred to
the NCB in exchange for liquidity in the amount of the asset’s current
market price (minus a haircut reflecting potential difficulties in realizing
the asset). The parties agree to reverse the transaction through a retransfer of the asset to the counterparty on the repurchase day, which
coincides with the maturity date of the typically short-termed lending
operation. Such repurchase agreements are collateralized per se because
they require a transfer of the ownership of the asset that underlies the
agreement.
Loans, on the other hand, require separate collateral. In exchange
for liquidity, the NCBs become creditors of the borrowing institutions
and holders of security rights in full title to any assets offered as
collateral.58 The security rights remain with the NCB at least until
55. See sources cited supra note 19 (on the principles of the European System of
Central Banks).
56. See Jean-Victor Louis, The Monetary Authority of the Euro Area, 2 EUR.
BANKING & FIN. L.J. [EUREDIA] 277 (2009) (illustrating the full range of the
competences shared by the ECB and the NCBs); Christian Hofmann, Central Bank
Collateral and the Lehman Collapse, 6 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 456, 460–64 (2011)
(detailing the open market operations of the NCBs).
57. See Protocol on the ESCB and the ECB, supra note 9.
58. See, e.g., GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK:
BANKING REGULATIONS, ch. V, nos. 1(1), 2(1), 3, 13, 23(1) (2011), available at
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maturity of the loan, and usually longer as the assets frequently serve as
collateral for future operations.59
2. Inflated Money Supply
In reaction to the crisis, the Euro system began expanding its
supply of liquidity to the banking sector on August 8, 2007 by providing
unlimited liquidity to banks in the Euro area on an overnight basis.60 In
the following months, it provided liquidity for periods of several months
to facilitate planning for those same banks. The System also introduced
the practice of “front loading”;61 during the first half of the month,
liquidity was distributed without limits. This had the intended effect of
providing security for the banks. In the second half of the month, when
banks were able to assess their actual demand, liquidity could gradually
be reduced. Liquidity was thereby granted for longer periods than usual,
yet due to the reduction in the second half of the month, the overall
amount of liquidity did not increase.62 The outbreak of the Lehman
crisis on September 15, 2008 required further measures. In October
2008, the Council of the ECB decided to provide unlimited liquidity to
all admitted credit institutions. Since then, credit institutions in the Euro
zone have had unlimited access to liquidity with fixed interest rates.
The ordinary process of tendering has been suspended.63

http://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/EN/Service/Services_for_banks_and_companies
/OMTOS/General_information/Terms_and_conditions/terms_and_conditions.html.
59. See Hofmann, supra note 56, at 460–64.
60. See id. at 462–67 (discussing the collateral requirements in detail).
61. See The ECB’s Response to the Financial Crisis, in EUROPEAN CENT. BANK,
MONTHLY BULLETIN: OCTOBER 2010, at 59, 64 (2010), available at www.ecb.int/pub/
pdf/mobu/mb201010en.pdf.
62. See id. at 64.
63. See id. at 66. See generally EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF MONETARY POLICY IN THE EURO AREA—GENERAL DOCUMENTATION ON
EUROSYSTEM MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND PROCEDURES: FEBRUARY 2011, 31
–41 (2011) [hereinafter GenDoc], available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/
gendoc2011en.pdf (describing the ordinary tender procedure). The GenDoc is a
consolidated (yet unofficial) booklet that includes all amendments and therefore
represents an up-to-date version of the seven chapters of the annex to Guideline
ECB/2000/7 of the European Central Bank of 31 August 2000 on Monetary Policy
Instruments and Procedures of the Eurosystem, 2000 O.J. (L 310) 1.
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3. Eased Security Standards
Expanded or even unlimited liquidity only creates trust when it is
easily accessible for banks. The Euro zone central banks, however,
require adequate collateral in exchange for loans provided to banks.64
The high requirements for collateral became a serious obstacle for the
credit institutions during the crisis. Consequently, the requirements
were lowered significantly.
The Euro system applies uniform standards for eligible security
assets to all Euro system credit operations. This harmonized standard
applied to collateral is called the “single list.”65 As a general rule to
limit the central banks’ exposure to risk, the list requires that the title of
the asset used for collateral is easily transferable and that the value of
the asset is easily realizable.66 Furthermore, external ratings of the
assets are mandatory, and the Euro zone applies haircuts to the estimated
value of the assets.67 The general rule is that longer residual maturities
of debt instruments result in higher haircuts than shorter ones.68
These requirements were generally relaxed after Lehman collapsed
and the financial crisis began to develop. The minimum rating
requirement for central government debt instruments (sovereign bonds)
was reduced to “BBB–” from A-; at the same time the haircut was raised
by 5%, at first temporarily.69 On January 1, 2011, these temporary
changes became permanent.70 Furthermore, the Governing Council of

64.
65.

See supra Part II.B.1. (liquidity provided by the Euro system).
See GenDoc, supra note 63, at 45 (describing how this new legal framework
entered into effect on January 1, 2007 and replaced the former two leveled system).
66. The requirements for adequate collateral are set out in Guideline ECB/2000/7
of the European Central Bank of 31 August 2000 on Monetary Policy Instruments and
Procedures of the Eurosystem, 2000 O.J. (L 310) 1, amended by Guideline
ECB/2010/13 of the European Central Bank of 16 September 2010, 2010 O.J. (L 267)
21 [hereinafter Guideline ECB/2010/13], which came into effect on October 10, 2010.
67. See GenDoc, supra note 63, at 61; see also Hofmann, supra note 56, at 463–65.
68. See generally GenDoc, supra note 63, at 72–73 (detailing a full classification).
69. See Guideline ECB/2008/18 of the European Central Bank of 21 November
2008 on Temporary Changes to the Rules Relating to Eligibility of Collateral, 2008 O.J.
(L 314) 14, amended by Guideline ECB/2009/24 of the European Central Bank of 10
December 2009, 2009 O.J. (L 330) 95. See also Press Release, ECB, Measures to
Further Expand the Collateral Framework and Enhance the Provision of Liquidity (Oct.
15, 2008), available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2008/html/
pr081015.en.html.
70. See Guideline ECB/2010/13, supra note 66.
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the ECB granted additional exceptions to these rules starting in May
2010. Through decisions on May 6, 2010, March 31, 2011, and July 7,
2011, the general requirements have been abandoned for Greek,
Portuguese and Irish sovereign bonds that are now eligible regardless of
their actual ratings.71 In February 2012, seven national central banks of
the Euro zone decided to further ease the collateral requirements to
encourage additional lending to banks.72 In September 2012, the ECB
expanded the list of eligible assets. Marketable debt instruments
denominated in currencies other than the Euro and issued and held in the
Euro area were declared eligible to be used as collateral. This measure
comes with the suspension of the minimum credit rating threshold for all
debt granted to or guaranteed by the countries participating in the Euro
zone’s bond purchasing programs.73
4. Covered Bond Purchase Programs
In order to provide liquidity for the market in covered bonds, the
Euro system purchased covered bonds in primary and secondary
markets for € 60 billion based on a June 6, 2009 decision. The program
expired in June 2010, but on October 6, 2011 the ECB announced a
further purchase program under which eligible covered bonds for a total

71. See Decision of the European Central Bank of 6 May 2010 on Temporary
Measures Relating to the Eligibility of Marketable Debt Instruments Issued or
Guaranteed by the Greek Government, 2010 O.J. (L 117) 102; Decision of the
European Central Bank of 31 March 2011 on Temporary Measures Relating to the
Eligibility of Marketable Debt Instruments Issued or Guaranteed by the Irish
Government, 2011 O.J. (L 94) 33; Decision of the European Central Bank of 7 July
2011 on Temporary Measures Relating to the Eligibility of Marketable Debt
Instruments Issued or Guaranteed by the Portuguese Government, O.J. (L 182) 31.
72. The seven central banks are the Central Bank of Ireland, Bank of Spain,
Banque de France, Bank of Italy, Central Bank of Cyprus, National Bank of Austria and
the Bank of Portugal. See EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, MONTHLY BULLETIN: FEBRUARY
2012, 29, available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/mobu/mb201202en.pdf. See also
ECB Approves Collateral Eligibility Criteria of Seven Eurosystem Central Banks,
CENTRALBANKING.COM (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.centralbanking.com/centralbanking/news/2145263/ecb-approves-collateral-eligibility-criteria-seven-eurosystemcentral-banks.
73. See Press Release, European Cent. Bank, Measures to Preserve Collateral
Availability (Sept. 6, 2012), available at http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/
pr120906_2.en.html; see also infra Part II.B.4.
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nominal amount of € 40 billion would be purchased through October
2012.74
5. Sovereign Bond Purchasing Programs
In its short history, the most drastic and criticized measure of the
Euro system has been its program for the purchase of sovereign bonds of
Euro zone members. The program started as a Securities Markets
Program (“SMP”) in May 2010 and authorized the Euro system to
purchase sovereign bonds denominated in Euro.75 Five countries
benefited from the program. In addition to bonds issued by the
beneficiaries of direct funding, which include Greece, Ireland, Portugal,
and most recently Spain, the central banks of the Euro zone have also
purchased Italian and Spanish bonds (in the case of Spain, prior to its
application for direct EFSF funding).76
In September 2012, the Euro system made the decision to start the
“Outright Monetary Transactions” program to replace the SMP.77 This
program allows the Euro zone to purchase sovereign bonds of Euro zone
member states that receive financial help from the EFSF or ESM.78
6. Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA)
The aforementioned measures of the Euro system, which are
determined by the ECB council and predominantly carried out by the
NCBs, are supplemented by measures of the NCBs to provide further
liquidity to financial institutions in need. The NCBs’ Emergency
74. See Press Release, European Cent. Bank, Covered Bond Purchase Programme
Completed (June 30, 2010), available at http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2010/html/
pr100630.en.html. See also Press Release, European Cent. Bank, ECB Announced
Details of Its New Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP2) (Nov. 3, 2011),
available at http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111103_1.en.html.
75. See Decision of the European Central Bank of 14 May 2010 Establishing a
Securities Markets Programme, 2010 O.J. (L 124) 8.
76. See Liquidity Analysis: Monetary Policy Portfolios, EUROPEAN CENT. BANK,
http://www.ecb.int/mopo/liq/html/index.en.html#portfolios (last visited Apr. 15, 2013)
(detailing the updated volumes of all the covered and sovereign bond purchase
programs).
77. See Press Release, European Cent. Bank, Technical Features of Outright
Monetary Transactions (Sept. 6, 2012), available at http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/
2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html.
78. See id.
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Liquidity Assistance (“ELA”) is a more modern term for the traditional
concept of “lender of last resort.” The ELA provides liquidity to an
individual or group of credit institutions, as opposed to liquidity
supplied via monetary policy operations addressed to all market
participants and the money market as a whole.79
Recapitalization efforts such as by EFSF or ESM funding take
time, whereas ELA assistance is more immediate. Several Euro zone
banks, especially in Greece, are deeply troubled by the financial crisis
and the bleak prospects in some local EU economies. They have been
further weakened by massive withdrawals of depositors. As a result,
their equity capital is negative and there exist no assets that might serve
as collateral for central bank loans. Thus, ELA by the NCBs, e.g., the
Greek central bank, is the major source of liquidity still available, as
well as the ultimate emergency measure keeping these banks from
collapsing.80
C. LEGAL ISSUES OF NON-STANDARD EURO ZONE MEASURES
1. Justification by the ECB
Non-standard measures call for justification. These measures are
unorthodox because they are outside the catalog of conventional
monetary measures that central banks in the ESCB ordinarily apply.81
The ECB argues that these measures are justified by a need to “address
the malfunctioning of securities markets and restore an appropriate
monetary policy transmission mechanism” and are therefore covered by
its mandate in Article 18 of the Protocol.82 The ECB has applied this
See EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, MONTHLY BULLETIN: 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
ECB 123–24 (2008), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/
10thanniversaryoftheecbmb200806en.pdf.
80. See Annika Breidthardt & Andreas Framke, ECB Stops Operation with Some
Greek Banks, REUTERS (May 16, 2012, 5:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/
05/16/us-ecb-greece-banks-idUSBRE84F0SN20120516 (discussing the precarious
situation of Greek central banks).
81. On the differences between conventional and non-standard (unconventional)
central bank measures, see Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Member, Exec. Bd. of the ECB,
Keynote Lecture at the Int’l Ctr. for Monetary and Banking Studies: Conventional and
Unconventional Monetary Policy (Apr. 28, 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/
review/r090429e.pdf. For typical conventional measures, see id. at 2.
82. For its justification of the SMP, see the Decision of the European Central Bank
of 14 May 2010 Establishing a Securities Markets Programme, supra note 75, 2010 O.J.
(L 124) 8, Preamble (3). See also Press Release, European Cent. Bank, ECB Decides on
79.
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line of justification to its new purchasing program called “Outright
Monetary Transactions” (“OMTs”).83
The ECB thereby expresses its concern that uncertainty in the
markets may hinder the ECB from achieving its monetary goals in
conventional ways. In ordinary times, central banks issue liquidity and
leave further steps to the markets.84 Before the crisis, the ECB similarly
relied on the assumption that the provided capital would circulate in the
markets and be allocated efficiently.85 In this situation, banks serve as
intermediaries and pass on the liquidity. However, these ordinary
mechanisms fail in situations of uncertainty or even distrust in the
markets.
Institutions store and accumulate liquidity instead of
circulating and distributing it. Banks take loans from the NCBs and
instead of passing on the capital in the form of loans to their customers,
they deposit it with the NCBs. The banks thereby accept losses from the
spread between their financing costs and the lower interest yield on
deposits, instead of generating profits from forwarding the capital to the
markets. In ordinary times, tendering restricts the money supply since
the tendered amount is fixed in advance and bids will only be satisfied
pro rata if the sum of bids exceeds the total amount of liquidity the
central banks intend to distribute.86 If stockpiling and general distrust
coincide with restrictions on the money supply, massive shortages of
capital occur in the markets. The central banks are advised to provide
unlimited capital in an attempt to reestablish trust and achieve an
efficient allocation of liquidity.87 The bond purchase programs pursue a
similar agenda. These programs are also based on the assumption that
Measures to Address Severe Tensions in Financial Market (May 10, 2010), available at
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2010/html/pr100510.en.html.
83. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. In its press release, dated
September 6, 2012, the ECB holds that its bond purchase under the OMTs “aim[s] at
safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the
monetary policy.” Press Release, Technical Features of Outright Monetary
Transactions, supra note 77.
84. See Keynote Lecture by Bini Smaghi, supra note 81, at 2.
85. See Protocol on the ESCB and the ECB, supra note 9, art. 2.
86. See GenDoc, supra note 63, at 36–37, ch. 5.1 (describing that in a tender
procedure bids can only be satisfied up to the total amount of liquidity the central bank
decides to allot).
87. See Laurent Le Maux & Laurence Scialom, Central Banks and Financial
Stability: Rediscovering the Lender-of-Last-Resort Practice in a Finance Economy, 37
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 1, 1 (2013) (discusses the central bank measures taken during the
crisis years and their deviation from common practices).
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providing central bank liquidity will benefit the whole range of market
participants, including governments that raise capital on the sovereign
bond markets. When the bond markets dry up because investors
withdraw over concerns about the sustainability of sovereign debt,
monetary policy is imperiled.
The solution of the central banks in the Euro zone sovereign debt
crisis has been to replace the investors in the secondary bond markets.
The sovereigns still need to find buyers in the primary markets, but the
intervention in the secondary markets by the Euro system sends out a
strong signal to investors in the primary markets. Primary market
investors need not fear to find themselves left with valueless sovereign
bond investments since the Euro system will buy them up on the
secondary markets.
For justification, the ECB emphasizes that it applies non-standard
measures to pursue its main monetary goal of price stability in the Euro
zone.88 Factually, however, the ECB has given in to the demands for
generous monetary support for frail countries and weak economies.
From a US perspective, this may sound persuasive. The Federal
Reserve System (“Fed”) traditionally acquires large amounts of US
Treasury Bills.89 The Euro system, however, does not have the double
mandate that has been entrusted to the Fed (and other central banks like
the Bank of Japan).90 TFEU Article 127 provides that “[t]he primary
objective of the European System of Central Banks . . . shall be to
maintain price stability.”91 Any additional monetary goal is clearly
88.
89.

See supra notes 75, 77.
See Terence P. Jeffrey, Fed Now Largest Owner of U.S. Gov’t Debt –
Surpassing China, CNSNEWS.COM (Nov. 16, 2011), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/
fed-now-largest-owner-us-gov-t-debt-surpassing-china.
90. See 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2006) (“The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the
monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to
increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment,
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”). On the Bank of England, that
also subordinates any other objectives to price stability, see Bank of England Act, 1998,
c. 11, § 11 (“In relation to monetary policy, the objectives of the Bank of England shall
be: (a) to maintain price stability, and (b) subject to that, to support the economic policy
of Her Majesty’s Government, including its objectives for growth and employment.”).
See also GUILLERMO DE LA DEHESA, MONETARY POLICY REPONSES TO THE CRISIS BY
ECB, FED, AND BOE 5–6 (2012), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
document/activities/cont/201208/20120820ATT49767/20120820ATT49767EN.pdf
(manuscript) (discussing the different mandates).
91. TFEU art. 127.
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subordinate: “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the
ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a
view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as
laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union.”92
2. Legal Issues
The purchase of sovereign bonds has been received with much
praise in the media.93 However, such voices focus entirely upon the
immediate effects on the markets and ignore the deeper implications.
The purchase programs are questionable with respect to the single
mandate of the ESCB and raise further serious legal issues. At first
glance, the ECB’s line of argumentation may seem consistent with
TFEU Article 127, which provides that “[t]he ESCB shall act in
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free
competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources . . . .”94
However, TFEU Article 123 reads:
(1) Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the
European Central Bank or with the central banks of the Member
States (hereinafter referred to as ‘national central banks’) in favour
of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central
governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies
governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States
shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the
European Central Bank or national central banks of debt instruments.
(2) Paragraph 1 shall not apply to publicly owned credit institutions
which, in the context of the supply of reserves by central banks, shall
be given the same treatment by national central banks and the
95
European Central Bank as private credit institutions.

This requires clarification of which central bank measures are
affected by this ban on monetary financing. The ECB argues that the
prohibition is limited to the direct wording of Article 123 and therefore
only prevents the central banks from purchasing sovereign debt on the
92.
93.

Id.
See Gideon Rachman, Five Events That Stood Out in 2012, THE STRAITS TIMES
(Sing.), Dec. 19, 2012 (referring to the OMT program as “one of the five most
important events” of the year 2012).
94. TFEU art. 127.
95. Id. art. 123.
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primary markets. The ECB considers purchases on the secondary
markets to be outside of the wording of the ban. It has further been
argued that the central banks only engage in ordinary market
transactions as typically carried out by commercial banks. These
transactions should be qualified as non-monetary as they are not based
on any commercial relationships between the central banks and the
governments.96
Critics—including a minority of the central banks of the Euro zone,
especially the German Bundesbank—argue that secondary market
purchases are covered by the broader scope of the provision that
banishes any attempt to finance sovereign debt by inflating liquidity.97
This opinion relies on reasoning 7 of Regulation (EC) Nr. 3603/93,
which prohibits central banks from circumventing the provisions of
TFEU Article 123 through secondary market purchases.98 It also
corresponds to the design of the disciplinary principles of the currency
union. They were critically summarized by Bini Smaghi, member of the
ECB directorate until the end of 2011, in three principles: (1) the duty to
discipline the governments falls upon the markets; (2) further discipline
is forced upon the governments by the Stability and Growth Pact, if
necessary by way of sanctions; and (3) the monetary union has been

96. On these arguments, see Phoebus Athanassiou, Of Past Measures and Future
Plans for Europe’s Exit from the Sovereign Debt Crisis: What is Legally Possible (And
What is Not), 36 EUR. L. REV. 558, 561–67 (2011); Louis, supra note 24, at 975. See
also Häde, supra note 52, at 400 (2009) (Ger.); Christoph Herrmann, EZB-Programm
für die Kapitalmärkte verstößt nicht gegen die Verträge – Erwiderung auf Martin
Seidel, 21 EuZW 645, 646 (2010) (Ger.).
97. Senior representatives of the Bundesbank have expressed their objections in
numerous interviews. Its former president, Axel Weber, criticized the measures
harshly. See, e.g., Bond Purchase Frictions Convinced Weber to Drop Out of ECB
Race, CENTRALBANKING.COM (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.centralbanking.com/centralbanking/news/2026150/bond-purchase-frictions-convinced-weber-drop-ecb-race. For
more on Weber’s view and the opinion of the current president, Jens Weidmann, see
Paul Carrel & Sakari Suoninen, ECB Growing More Skeptical of Bond-Buys:
Weidmann, REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2011, 9:40 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/
12/14/us-ecb-bundesbank-weidmann-idUSTRE7BD14X20111214. Juergen Stark,
former chief economist of the ECB, resigned in protest against the SMP. See Gabi
Thesing & Jana Randow, ECB Seen Favoring Bond Buying Over Bank Loans,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 13, 2013, 10:21 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0412/ecb-seen-favoring-bond-buying-over-bank-loans-as-crisis-deepens.html.
98. Council Regulation 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 Specifying Definitions for
the Application of the Prohibitions Referred to in Articles 104 and 104b (1) of the
Treaty, 1993 O.J. (L 332) 1 (EC).
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built upon the principle that every member state should be forced to
cope with the consequences of its fiscal policy individually.99
Bini Smaghi has joined a large group of critics who conclude that at
least the last principle has turned out to be illusory.100 As already
described above,101 it is certainly true that the latest developments have
shown the shortcomings of the Euro system architecture. However, the
legal provisions of the TFEU as well as of the Protocol on the ESCB and
the ECB still form the basis on which the monetary union is based. If
the provisions and assumptions of the treaty are circumvented by ECB
measures as well as rescue measures outside the union, it may be seen as
an attempt to circumvent the democratic basis of the union. This may
further erode trust in the union and raise doubts about whether the legal
framework of the union is being accepted and followed by governments
and central banks.
The strongest argument against bond purchases is that the ECB has
converted them into a regular mechanism to influence the markets
through its September 2012 decision. Initially, the argument that the
bond purchases were merely a short-lived stability measure to overcome
temporary failures in the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy
was persuasive. However, these measures have been extended to
sovereign bonds of five Euro countries (with the potential of more to
come) and have been said to be without “quantitative limits” unless
termination is decided upon by the ECB Council.102
Returning to the US perspective, these arguments against the nonstandard measures may seem exaggerated, as the Fed has frequently
applied similar measures.103 However, the situation in the Euro zone is
by no means comparable to the situation in the US, neither from a legal
nor economic perspective. It cannot be sufficiently emphasized that the
EU (as well as the Euro zone) seems further from becoming a federal
union than ever. The member states have been, and still are, sovereign
99. See Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Exec. Bd. Member, ECB, Address at “The Group of
Thirty,” 63rd Plenary Session, Session I: The Crisis of the Eurosystem (May 28, 2010),
available at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100528.en.html.
100. See Louis, supra note 24, at 979–81.
101. See supra Part II.A.3.
102. See Press Release, Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transactions,
supra note 77.
103. See DE LA DEHESA, supra note 90, at 5, 8 (discussing the recent, non-standard
measures of the Fed and the BoE, as well as the differences between the challenges for
the ECB as compared to the Fed and the BoE).
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countries. The EU institutions and several heads of state and
government have discussed plans to move on to the next step of a fiscal
union, which transfers money from the richer to the poorer member
states, collectivizes sovereign debt (and potentially private debt as in the
case of financial institutions), and creates new competencies for the
European Commission and the ECB—such as deciding the amount of
transfers and debt for the individual member state.104
However, discontent among voters in the member states is growing.
As of now, the only unifying element throughout the EU seems to be
general discontent regarding the current situation. These circumstances
are predominantly blamed upon too much power over domestic policy in
the hands of the supranational organs. Furthermore, such plans need the
approval of the ten non-members of the EU, among them Sweden and
the UK. It seems unlikely that these countries will support further
transfers of powers to Brussels. This opposition became apparent at the
ECOFIN meeting of the EU finance ministers in September 2012.105
As of May 2013, the Euro zone is more comparable to a random
group of seventeen of the fifty US states than to the US as a whole.
Imagine a monetary union of seventeen randomly picked states
including some with entirely different profiles, such as New York or
California, as opposed to Montana or Kansas. Now imagine further that
there was no political union and that the economic ties were limited to
free trade and a common monetary policy.106 The states would share a
central bank, which would purchase a large number of the states’
104. Such political ambitions have culminated in the September 12, 2012 speech by
the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, in which he called for
a “federation of nation states.” See José Manuel Barroso, President, European Comm’n,
2012 State of the Union Address at the Plenary Session of the European Parliament
(Sept. 12, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12596_en.htm. On the plans for a “banking union” see Press Release, European Comm’n,
Update - Banking Union (June 22, 2012), available at europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_MEMO-12-478_en.pdf. On further developments, see Christian Hofmann,
Stabilizing the Financial Sector: EU Financial Services 2010–2012, 8 EUROPEAN REV.
CONT. L. [ERCL] 426 (2012) (Ger.).
105. On the Swedish resistance to the planned Banking Union, see Sweden’s Borg
Dismisses EU’s Bank Supervision Plan, supra note 20. On recent reservations from the
government of the UK, see David Cameron Says UK Should “Ask for Change on
Europe,” BBC NEWS (Jan 6, 2013, 11:27 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics20926563.
106. The ties among the Euro zone countries are certainly stronger than the
hypothetical I describe, but the illustrated facts are the relevant factors for the
coordination of the monetary union.
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sovereign bonds. However, each of the states would still pursue its own
political and economic agendas. The money supply of this currency
union would be expanded constantly, thus raising fears of inflation. The
question is merely rhetorical: would such a construction create trust and
confidence in the markets?
The European monetary union has been established based on the
assumption that the ECB would pursue one goal alone: price stability.107
Financing of member states was meant to be left to the markets, which
would base investments on their assessment of a state’s fiscal situation.
The markets were meant to punish any failure in discipline by the
member states. As mentioned above, these concepts proved illusory.
The markets overestimated the potential of a common currency; they
made refinancing significantly cheaper for the currency union member
states than before under their individual currencies.108
In addition, it seems questionable to burden the central banks with
duties that truly should be imposed on the governments. At the same
pace that the central banks step up their efforts to replace the
disappearing investors, the governments reduce their efforts to improve
the attractiveness of their bonds with a combination of austerity
measures (in ineffective fields) and stimulus measures (in fields which
show potential). This may result in negative incentives or, put
differently, in moral hazards.109
III. SOVEREIGN DEFAULT AND RESTRUCTURING
The bitter lesson to be learned from the Euro zone crisis is that
highly developed countries are not immune from crises that were in the
past more common to developing countries.110 It has become evident
that even highly developed countries can encounter serious difficulties
when trying to refinance their sovereign debt, and that they may even
107.
108.

On the single mandate of the ECB, see discussion supra Part II.C.1.
For information on Greek lending yields, see Government Benchmark Bond
Prices and Yields, BANK OF GREECE, http://www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/en/Statistics/
rates_markets/titloieldimosiou/titloieldimosiou.aspx (last visited Apr.15, 2013).
109. On this moral hazard, see ECB JULY BULLETIN, supra note 40, at 78.
110. See GERARD CAPRIO ET AL., FINANCIAL CRISES: LESSONS FROM THE PAST,
PREPARATION FOR THE FUTURE 87–117 (2005) (discussing sovereign defaults in the
recent past); GRP. OF TEN, THE RESOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN LIQUIDITY CRISES: A
REPORT TO THE MINISTERS AND GOVERNORS PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE
DEPUTIES 7 (1996), available at www.bis.org/publ/gten03.pdf.
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default. The Euro zone, therefore, requires measures that have longterm stabilizing effects. For the banking sector, the EU is planning a
refinancing and restructuring regime.111 On the sovereign level,
solutions are more difficult to find, though the Euro zone pursues two
approaches. A permanent fund is intended to provide financial
emergency assistance to member countries,112 while a restructuring
regime is meant to prevent or deal with sovereign default.
A. SOVEREIGN DEBT RESOLUTION MECHANISM (SDRM)
The idea of a restructuring regime for sovereign debtors is not new.
It has not only been a topic in academic circles, but was also discussed
by the G10 in 2002.113 Since insolvency principles do not apply to
sovereign debtors, there have been plans to establish an internationally
recognized restructuring procedure, the basic principles of which would
be similar to the Chapter 11 framework under US bankruptcy law.114
Such a procedure would lead to a moratorium of sovereign debt and
implement a restructuring plan effective to all creditors of a sovereign.
The major advantage of such an approach is its comprehensive effect:
all claims against the sovereign can be treated equally; the haircut is
paramount.115

111. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council: Establishing A Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit
Institutions and Investment Firms, COM (2012) 280 final (June 6, 2012).
112. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.c (on the ESM).
113. GRP. OF TEN, REPORT OF THE G-10 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL
CLAUSES 1 (2002), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf. On sovereign debt
restructurings in the past, see Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña y Barroso, Identical

Collective Action Clauses for Different Legal Systems: A European Model, in
COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOVEREIGN DEBT,
supra note 6, at 15, 17–18. See also Udaibir S. Das, Michael G. Papaioannou &
Christoph Trebesch, Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950–2010: Literature Survey,
Data, and Stylized Facts (IMF, Working Paper No. 12/203, 2012), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12203.pdf.
114. Chapter 11 allows a majority of creditors to adopt a plan of restructuring with
binding effect on all creditors. This requires creditors who hold at least two-thirds of
the debt, as well as a majority of all creditor claimants, to accept the plan. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1126(c), 1129(a)(8) (2006).
115. See Christoph G. Paulus, A Resolvency Proceeding for Default Sovereigns, 3
INT’L INSOLVENCY L. REV. [IILR] 1 (2012) (Ger.) (discussing SDRM concepts);
FRANÇOIS GIANVITI ET AL., A EUROPEAN MECHANISM FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS
RESOLUTION: A PROPOSAL (2010), available at http://www.bruegel.org/publications/
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The disadvantages are similarly striking: both the sovereign and the
debtors become subject to the decision of a third party that forces its
rules upon them. This raises the question of within which institution
such powers could be vested—potentially the IMF, a UN institution, or
a yet-to-be-created international court.116 In the absence of a sovereign
restructuring regime, arbitration tribunals hold an important role in stateinvestor disputes.117
In the EU, it seems more feasible to overcome reservations against
a Sovereign Debt Resolution Mechanism (“SDRM”). The EU could
establish general binding rules for the restructuring of sovereign debt
and create an institution to execute the restructuring, namely, create a
chamber for restructuring at the ECJ.118 For the time being, however,
such approaches are not being pursued. However, more Euro zone
defaults, such as the Greek default of March 2012,119 could revive the
idea of a European SDRM.
B. COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES
Compared to an SDRM, collective action clauses pursue a modest
approach. They also enable the restructuring of a sovereign’s debt in
bonds, but contrary to an SDRM, they rely entirely on the principle of
consent. This is why, for the time being, the Euro zone favors them
over an SDRM.
1. Nature and Effects of Collective Action Clauses
Collective action clauses in sovereign bond issues can be defined as
a compendium of standardized provisions within sovereign bond

publication-detail/publication/446-a-european-mechanism-for-sovereign-debt-crisisresolution-a-proposal; Beatrice Weder di Mauro & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, European
Debt Restructuring Mechanism as a Tool for Crisis Prevention, VOX (Nov. 26, 2010),
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/5845.
116. GIANVITI ET AL., supra note 115, at 28–29.
117. See discussion infra Part IV. It should be added, however, that there is no
generally approved regime for state-investor arbitration either. See JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ,
THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
257–61 (2011).
118. GIANVITI ET AL., supra note 115, at 28–29.
119. See infra Part IV.
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contracts.120 Their major purpose is to introduce a principle of majority
voting into the bond terms. If a qualified majority of bondholders
agrees to a proposed restructuring of the bond obligations, all bonds are
modified.121 Majority provisions in collective action clauses thereby
deviate from one of the most basic principles of contract law, as the
contractual claims of the dissenting minority are modified without their
consent.122 This mechanism is designed to overcome the so-called
holdout problem—the phenomenon that bondholders will wait for their
peers to give in to the demands of the creditor in order to profit from the
compromise and get paid in full.123
120. On the terminology, see Frank Elderson & Marino Perassi, Collective Action
Clauses in Sovereign Foreign Bonds, Towards a More Harmonised Approach, 4
EUREDIA 239, 241 (2003) (Belg.) (“Collective action clauses (CACs) are the
denominator usually given to a number of different clauses found in various forms and
to a varying degree in bond contracts under the laws of various jurisdictions which have
in common, principally, that they enable a majority of bondholders to bind a minority
against their will to the amendment of the terms of the contract and to a number of other
actions in relation to the bonds (such as acceleration and de-acceleration)”). See also
GRP. OF TEN, THE RESOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN LIQUIDITY CRISES, supra note 110, at 16.
121. On majority provisions in Collective Action Clauses following the English law
model, see Lachlan Burn, Bond Issues Under U.K. Law: How the Proposed German
Legislation Compares, in DIE REFORM DES SCHULDVERSCHREIBUNGSRECHTS 219, 238
(Theodor Baums & Andreas Cahn eds., 2004) (Ger.). On American law style collective
action clauses, see Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective
Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1329 (2002). On the impediments for collective action
clauses resulting from the Trust Indenture Act (“TIA”), which has been applied beyond
its limited scope to sovereign bonds, see George W. Shuster, Jr., The Trust Indenture
Act and International Debt Restructurings, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 431 (2006).
On an international approach to majority provisions, see GRP. OF TEN, REPORT OF THE
G-10 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 113, at 3.
122. On the principle that modifications to contract terms require the approval of
each party to the contract, see 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, CHITTY ON CONTRACTS: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES (Hugh Beale ed., 2004); EWAN MCKENDRICK, CONTRACT LAW: TEXT,
CASES AND MATERIALS 939–40 (3d ed. 2008); G. H. TREITEL & EDWIN PEEL, THE LAW
OF CONTRACT 312 (6th ed. 2004).
123. On the holdout problem, see Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in
Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59, 65–66 (2000); Laura Alfaro, Noel
Maurer, & Faisal Ahmed, Gunboats and Vultures: Market Reaction to the
‘Enforcement’ of Sovereign Debt 4 (Apr. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workshops/papers/History/Maurer,%20Gunboats%20and%2
0Vultures,%20version%205.2.pdf; Patrick Kenadjian, Bond Issues under New York and
U.S. Law: Considerations for the German Law Maker from a U.S. Perspective, in DIE
REFORM DES SCHULDVERSCHREIBUNGSRECHTS, supra note 121, at 245, 263. See also
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Pricing Terms in Sovereign Debt
Contracts: A Greek Case Study with Implications for the European Crisis Resolution
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The discussion about harmonized standards for collective action
clauses in sovereign bond contracts emerged before the Euro zone
sovereign debt crisis. The G10 in 1996 and the G20 in 2002
recommended them and drafted rudimentary model clauses,124 but these
proposals have not found broad approval. Highly developed countries
in particular have not made use of these bond terms in their domestic
issues (designating issues under domestic law). Only international
issues under foreign law commonly include collective action clauses,125
but highly developed countries issue the vast majority of bonds
domestically.126
One way of looking at the March 2012 restructuring of Greek
127
debt is that it is indicative of the need for collective action clauses.
Mechanism, 6 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 163 (2011) (concluding that Collective Action
Clauses should create creditor confidence and potentially lower the cost of financing, at
least for financially stable sovereigns). See also Elderson & Perassi, supra note 120, at
262; Liz Dixon & David Wall, Collective Action Problems and Collective Action
Clauses, FIN. STABILITY REV. 142, 148 (2000) (U.K.).
124. See GRP. OF TEN, THE RESOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN LIQUIDITY CRISES, supra
note 110, at 16, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten03.pdf; GRP. OF TEN, REPORT
OF THE G-10 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, supra note 113, at 3.
125. See David G. Sabel, An Introduction to the Euro Area’s Model Collective

Action Clause, in COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF
SOVEREIGN DEBT, supra note 6, at 29, 31; Klaus-Albert Bauer, The Euro Area’s
Collective Action Clause – Some Questions and Answers, in: COLLECTIVE ACTION
CLAUSES AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOVEREIGN DEBT, supra note 6, at 3, 4.
126. See IULIA STANISLAV EMINESCU, EUROSTAT, STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
DEBT IN EUROPE IN 2011: UPWARD TREND IN THE EU GOVERNMENT DEBT LEVEL
CONTINUED IN 2011, at 4 fig.6 (2012), available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-12-034/EN/KS-SF-12-034-EN.PDF. See also Patrick

Kenadjian, The Aggregation Clause in Euro Area Government Securities: Game
Changer or Flavor of the Month? – Background and the Greek Experience, in
COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOVEREIGN DEBT,
supra note 6, at 113, 121; Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Restructuring a Nation's
Debt, 29 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 46–49 (2010), reprinted in, MANAGING RISK IN THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 168–78 (John Raymond LaBrosse, Rodrigo Olivares-Camimal,
Dalvinder Singh, eds., 2010), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_
scholarship/2336 (discussing Greek sovereign debt). Detailed legal provisions are
included in the terms of corporate, but not sovereign bond issues. Statutes on corporate
bonds exist in practically all Euro zone countries, e.g., in Germany, see the codification
in the Gesetz über Schuldverschreibungen aus Gesamtemissionen [SchVG] [Act on
Notes from Issues of Identical Debt Securities], July 31, 2009, BGBL. I at 2512, and in
France, Art. L 228-38 to L 228-90 of the Code de Commerce.
127. See discussion supra Part IV.
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Back in the 1980s, restructurings could be worked out on a multilateral
basis by bringing major creditors together to negotiate a deal with the
sovereign debtor, for example, according to the principals of the Paris
and London Club.128 This procedure seems to have worked for several
sovereign debt crises in Central America in the 1980s.129 The number of
creditors however was more limited than it is today, as funding came
predominantly from American, European, and Japanese banks.130
In contrast, the Argentine crisis escalated because it involved a vast
number of foreign investors.131 The situation in the Euro zone is equally
complex; the sovereign debt of the larger Euro zone economies is held
by large numbers of investors throughout the world.132
2. The Euro Zone Standardization of Collective Action Clauses
The Euro zone has agreed on a project of revolutionary magnitude:
all seventeen Euro zone countries will use standardized collective action
clauses.133 This will catapult collective action clauses in sovereign bond
issues from a marginal position to one of core significance. So far there
have been a number of frequently used terms in international issues of
sovereign bonds that commonly underlie English or New York state
law, but there is no set of rules that could be considered a common
standard.134 The purpose of introducing standardized collective action
clauses is to establish equal standards for all Euro zone bonds, thus
creating transparency and market confidence. Since all countries will
128.
129.
130.

On the principles of the Paris Club, see discussion supra Part I.B.
On these crises, see CAPRIO ET AL., supra note 110, at 87–117.
See Nancy Neiman Auerbach, Latin American Debt Crisis, in 2 THE
PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 727, 728 (Kenneth A. Reinert et
al. eds., 2009).
131. See, e.g., Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶¶ 316–18 (Aug. 4, 2011), available at
http://italaw.com/documents/AbaclatDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf. See also discussion
supra Part IV.
132. See EMINESCU, supra note 126. See also Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 126
(discussing Greek sovereign debt).
133. See Collective Action Clause: Common Terms of Reference, EUROPA ECON. &
FIN.
COMM.,
http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/cac_-_text_model_cac.pdf;
Collective Action Clause: Supplemental Provisions, EUROPA ECON. & FIN. COMM.,
http://europa.eu/efc/sub_committee/pdf/cac_-_supplemental_provisions.pdf. On the
drafting process, see Sabel, supra note 125, at 29.
134. On the dominance of the law of New York and England, see Kenadjian, supra
note 123, at 246.
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use the same provisions, it can be assumed that the Euro zone politicians
hope that collective action clauses will be regarded as a common and
neutral element of sovereign bond issues, and not an indicator of a
potential sovereign default.
Yet, from a legal perspective, another element is even more
fascinating: the enormous volume of sovereign bonds in the Euro zone
promises to set a worldwide standard for the first time in the history of
sovereign bonds.135
IV. RESTRUCTURING OF GREEK DEBT
Sovereign bonds are the major source of finance for modern
industrialized nations, which rely on a system of revolving debt. The
current sovereign debt crisis in the Euro zone illustrates that once
markets lose confidence in the sustainability of a country’s debt, market
refinancing becomes unaffordable.
Greek debt was restructured in March 2012, when private creditors
of the Hellenic Republic accepted an exchange offer that led to a haircut
on their debt. Greek domestic bonds were exchanged for new bonds
with lower principal, lower interest rates, and longer maturity.
A. PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT
The Greek restructuring took place in the form of a so-called
Private Sector Involvement—a voluntary haircut accepted by the private
holders of Greek bond debt. Over ninety percent of Greece’s private
creditors participated. The remaining holders of Greek bonds withstood
political pressure and did not participate in what was called a
“voluntary” bond restructuring. In particular, some hedge funds did not
trade in their old bonds. As a result, the restructuring was accompanied
by Greece’s announcement that all remaining old bonds would never be
paid. The remaining creditors who defied the exchange would either
lose everything or be forced into an exchange. Greece threatened to

135. It should, however, be mentioned that the standardized set of rules does not
address all legal issues, on this in detail. See Christian Hofmann, Sovereign Debt
Restructuring in Europe under the new model Collective Action Clauses, 49 TEX. INT'L
L.J. (forthcoming 2014).
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compel this exchange by the introduction of retroactive (also called
retrofit) collective action clauses.136
Under the current situation in the Euro zone where sovereign
restructurings seem far from impossible, it seems worth analyzing
whether legal obstacles would impede the introduction of such
retroactive collective action clauses.
B. RETROACTIVE COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES
1. Greek Constitution, ECHR and BITs
Prior to the haircut, domestic bonds were issued under Greek law
and the underlying issuance contract did not contain terms to protect the
investors from negative changes of the legal framework (for example, in
the form of a “stabilization” or “freezing” clause).137 Taking advantage
of this fact, Greece announced plans to enact a law that would
automatically amend all domestic bonds if a set majority of bondholders
accepted the voluntary exchange offer.138 What sounded like a
legislative measure that left the decision about the amendment to the
private sector was actually a mere paltry excuse: the decision by the

136. On all of these events and the threat to introduce Collective Action Clauses
retroactively, see Kenadjian, supra note 123, at 126–28; Klaus-Albert Bauer, supra
note 125 at 8–9; Landon Thomas, Jr., Bond Deal Narrows Options For Greece, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/10/
business/global/greece-debt-restructuring-deal-private-lenders.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=0; Melissa A. Boudreau, Restructuring Sovereign Debt Under Local Law: Are
Retrofit Collective Action Clauses Expropriatory?, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 164,
166–67 (2012). On the effect of the Greek restructuring on credit default swaps for
Greek sovereign debt, see Richard Squire, A Market for End-of-the-World Insurance?
Credit Default Swaps on US Government Debt, in IS U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT
DIFFERENT? 69, 73–77 (Franklin Allen, Anna Gelpern, Charles Mooney & David

Skeel eds., 2012).
137. This can be considered common practice for domestic issues of sovereign
bonds, a practice that will change with the introduction of collective action clauses. See
discussion supra Part III.B.
138. For some of the facts of the Greek restructuring, see ‘Historic Opportunity’:
Greece Pulls Off Debt Restructuring Deal, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Mar. 9, 2012, 12:51 PM),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/historic-opportunity-greece-pulls-off-debtrestructuring-deal-a-820343.html. On the negative effect of a restructuring on the
markets, see Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 123, at 175. However, restructuring of
domestic bonds by legislative means did happen in the past. See Buchheit & Gulati,
supra note 126 (discussing the dangers involved).
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qualified majority of bondholders had already been taken before the
potential enactment of the law.
Therefore, the question arises whether such a procedure leads to an
expropriation of the bondholders’ property. Article 17(2) of the Greek
constitution provides that “[n]o one shall be deprived of his property
except for public benefit which must be duly proven, when and as
specified by statute and always following full compensation
corresponding to the value of the expropriated property at the time of the
court hearing on the provisional determination of compensation.”139 To
similar effect, Article 1 of the Protocol to the European Convention on
Human Rights (“ECHR”) guarantees that “[e]very natural or legal
person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and
subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law.” Finally, the Bilateral Investment
Treaties (“BITs”) that Greece entered into could become relevant. BITs
generally contain rules on the expropriation of foreign investments and
provide that expropriation measures must generally be
non‐discriminatory, for a public purpose, accompanied by prompt,
adequate and effective compensation and in accordance with due
process of law.140
2. Expropriation of Bondholders
Bondholders’ protection under these provisions is dependent on
whether the exchange of bond debt by way of retroactive collective
action clauses qualifies as an expropriation, and in the case of BITs, on
the controversial preliminary question of whether sovereign bond debt is
covered by BITs.141 It could be argued that the actual haircut follows
from the voluntary decision taken by a qualified majority of the

139.
140.

1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 17(2) (Greece).
See 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 6, Apr. 2012. See also
JEFFREY DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM
ORIENTED APPROACH 87–92 (2d ed. 2006).
141. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT AND IMPACT ON INVESTMENT RULEMAKING, at 9–17, U.N. Sales No.
E.07.II.D.10 (2007) (discussing the approach to covered debt, the investors entitled to
claims, and the changing opinion on minority shareholders).
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bondholders, not by the legislative act.142 However, in the current
scenario, this line of argumentation must fail. It is merely formalistic
and ignores the predetermined outcome of the law as well as the obvious
intentions of the legislator. The Greek scenario is incomparable to the
general exercise of standard collective action clauses. The necessary
number of bondholders gave its consent prior to the enactment of the
law. Furthermore, this law does not define or amend the legal situation
in a general way or for an indefinite number of cases. It is meant for
exactly one case, and the beneficiary is the country itself. These
benefits are not merely incidental, but are the very purpose for which the
law is being enacted. In contrast, a typical legislative measure regulates
legal relationships in a general way and with no regard to a specific
case. If, for example, the legislator changes the laws on rental property,
the government may well benefit as part of a multitude of affected
landlords. However, this effect is merely incidental and not the pursued
legislative purpose. It should follow that when a sovereign chooses to
deal with investors on a contractual basis, this method of legal action
implies a waiver for any recourse to sovereign powers. It seems
contradictory to turn to sovereign powers when conflicts arise in order
to avoid being held to contractual promises.
However, some jurisdictions sanction the use of retroactive action
clauses. Germany is an example for such jurisdictions as the German
statutes on corporate bonds in the Schuldverschreibungsgesetz allow the
introduction of retroactive majority provisions into existing bond terms
by majority vote.143 Yet, this possibility under German law is
incomparable to the Greek scenario. The Schuldverschreibungsgesetz
does not apply to German sovereign bonds; by enacting this law, the
German legislator acted in its general legislative capacity and regulated
the contractual relationship of third parties in an abstract and general
way, not the contractual relationship of the Federal Republic of
Germany to investors in its bonds.

142. For this line of argumentation, see Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 126
(considering Greek retroactive Collective Action Clauses in a less drastic scenario).
143. See Gesetz über Schuldverschreibungen aus Gesamtemissionen [SchVG] [Act
on Notes from Issues of Identical Debt Securities], July 31, 2009, BGBL. I at 2512, §
24(2) (Ger.).
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3. Inequality of Treatment
In addition, issues of unequal treatment arise because the
restructuring only affects the private sector. All public debt is
exempted, including all bonds held by the European financial facilities
and especially the large number of Greek bonds owned by the central
banks. This does not necessarily indicate a breach of the principle of
equal treatment, which is open to justification. In this case, justification
could lie in the fact that the public sector provided and continues to
provide the liquidity necessary to guarantee the future sustainability of
Greek debt. In the words of the ECB, the Euro system has purchased
the bonds as part of their Securities Markets Program in order to
implement its monetary policy in times of perturbed transposition
mechanisms.144 However, a proper assessment of such justification
would require that these reasons be communicated clearly by the
legislator.
C. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (BITS)
BITs seem to be bondholders’ best chance at arguing their case for
expropriation compensation. BITs are bilateral treaties between two
governments created with the goal of mutually protecting private foreign
investment. BITs give rise to individual claims and remedies. They
generally protect foreign investment from expropriation by requiring
strict conditions before these takings can arise, and appropriate
compensation once the expropriation occurs. They further provide for
non-discrimination and fair and equitable treatment clauses, which
ensure that foreign investors are not discriminated against relative to
nationals or third parties.145
1. Application of BITs to Investments in Bonds
The typical investment protected by BITs is a direct investment in
the host’s territory, including the acquisition of assets held in the host
country or the acquisition of a majority shareholding position. It is, on
the other hand, an unresolved issue whether indirect investments also
benefit from the protection, especially investments in sovereign bonds.
144.
145.

See discussion supra Part II.C.
See ALVAREZ, supra note 117, at 30–33.
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a. The Argentine Default
A recent arbitration decision, however, helps to shed light on this
issue. The Arbitral Tribunal at the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) in Washington, D.C., delivered a
decision in Abaclat et al. and the Argentine Republic on various claims
against Argentina resulting from a default of their sovereign bonds. It
was decided on the basis of the Argentina-Italy BIT, which went into
effect on October 14, 1990. This decision affects the claims of over
180,000 individuals and corporations. In this case, Argentina defaulted
on its sovereign bonds in December 2001 and in the following years
extended exchange offers to the investors. In 2005, Argentina enacted a
law (the “Cram Down” or “Emergency” Law), which provided that the
exchange procedure would not reopen for bonds that had not been
exchanged.146
b. Exercise of Sovereign Powers
One of the essential issues in Abaclat concerned the tribunal’s
jurisdiction in light of the contractual nature of the investors’ claims
against Argentina, a matter of equal importance in the Greek scenario.
The tribunal held that “[w]ith respect to a BIT claim an arbitral tribunal
has no jurisdiction where the claim at stake is a pure contract claim . . .
because a BIT is not meant to correct or replace contractual remedies . .
.”147 But it added that “[w]here the equilibrium of the contract and the
provisions contained therein” were “unilaterally altered by a sovereign
act of the Host State” the claim could not be considered a pure contract
claim.148 The tribunal decided to apply this exception where “[t]he
circumstances and/or the behavior of the Host State appear to derive
from its exercise of sovereign State power. Whilst the exercise of such
power may have an impact on the contract and its equilibrium, its origin
and nature are totally foreign to the contract.”149
The tribunal saw these circumstances in the Argentine Emergency
Law of 2005.150 In the case of Greece, the retroactive collective action
146. See Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶¶ 10–50 (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/
documents/AbaclatDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf.
147. Id. ¶ 316.
148. Id. ¶ 318.
149. Id.
150. Id. ¶¶ 321–26.
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clauses enacted by a Greek law fulfill these exceptional requirements.
By passing such a law, Greece applies means that have no basis in the
bond contracts and do not stem from its rights as a party to the contract,
but instead are wholly based on its sovereign powers.
c. Qualification of Investment
A further issue in the Argentine situation that is applicable to the
Greek scenario is the meaning of “investment.” The BIT was only
relevant insofar as the bond claims could be qualified as investment
claims under the scope of the BIT. In determining the matter, the
tribunal interpreted the wording of the BIT and decided that the BIT
pursued a wide approach. Article 1 of the unofficial English translation
provides that:
“[i]nvestment shall mean, in compliance with the legislation of the
receiving State and independent of the legal form adopted or of any
other legislation of reference, any conferment or asset invested or
reinvested by an individual or corporation of one Contracting Party
in the territory of the other Contracting Party, in compliance with the
151
laws and regulations of the latter party.”

Article 1 names further examples of investments, including “bonds,
private or public financial instruments or any other right to
performances or services having economic value, including capitalized
revenues.”152 The tribunal started its analysis by looking for “[r]ights
and values which may be endangered by measures of the Host State,
such as an expropriation, and therefore deserve protection.”153 It came
to the conclusion that with respect to the protective purpose of the BIT
and in light of the wording of Article 1, the Argentine sovereign bonds
were a form of investment covered by the protection under the BIT.154
A further issue was whether the bond purchases constituted an
investment “in the territory of the other Contracting Party,” which is a
common requirement in BITs. Argentina argued that the bondholders’
purchases did not qualify as such an investment since the investment
had taken place between investors and banks as intermediaries.155
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. ¶ 336.
Id.
Id. ¶ 347.
Id. ¶¶ 360–61.
Id. ¶ 373.
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Therefore, no actual transfer of money from the investors to Argentina
had taken place. In response to these objections, the tribunal defined the
criteria that are relevant to investments of a purely financial nature. It
held that it was essential “[w]here and/or for the benefit of whom the
funds are ultimately used, and not the place where the funds were paid
out or transferred.”156 The tribunal dismissed the argument that the
intermediaries, as primary underwriters, extended the principal to
Argentina, and only afterwards received payments from their customers.
For the tribunal, the only relevant point was the fact that the
underwriters extended their lump payment because they would “[b]e
able to collect sufficient funds from the individual purchasers of security
entitlements . . .” and that “[t]he funds generated through the bonds
issuance process were ultimately made available to Argentina . . . .”157
All of these holdings by the tribunal support the qualification of
Greek sovereign debt as “investments” under the BITs entered into by
Greece.
d. Dissenting Opinions
Though a majority of tribunal members made the Abaclat decision,
there is a dissenting opinion that argues for a more limited definition of
investments.158 Argentina has filed for an annulment of the decision and
the result of the annulment procedure seems unpredictable. This is due
to the fact that there is no established opinion on the definition of an
investment, and other ICSID tribunals have come to different
conclusions. Whereas the majority in Abaclat held that the definition of
investment should be decided independently based on the provisions of
the individual BIT, other tribunals favor a more general approach and
base their definition of investments on the wording of the ICSID
Convention. Article 25(1) of the Convention provides that “[t]he
jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State . . . and a
national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute
consent in writing to submit to the Centre.”159 Some tribunals have
156.
157.
158.

Id. ¶ 374.
Id. ¶¶ 376–78.
See Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Oct. 28, 2011) (Abi-Saab, Arb., dissenting), available at
http://italaw.com/documents/Abaclat_Dissenting_Opinion.pdf.
159. See, e.g., Joy Mining Mach. Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction (Aug. 6, 2004), 19 ICSID Rev. 486, 499 (2004);
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decided that this provision of the Convention contained an objective
standard from which the parties to a treaty could not deviate.160
However, even the supporters of such an “objective standard
theory” have not agreed on a uniform definition of investment. Whereas
one tribunal excluded contingent liabilities from the scope of an
investment, another required that the investor participate in the risks of
the transaction.161 The latter approach could exclude sovereign bonds
from the definition of an investment since the bondholders do not bear
typical business risks. Their risks are limited to a sovereign default and
therefore to the precise situation that gives rise to the dispute.
However, such a limited interpretation of the term “investment”
seems unfounded. Bondholders are as exposed to arbitrary sovereign
measures as other investors. Furthermore, the purpose of BITs and
other treaties on the protection of Foreign Direct Investment should be
considered. The amount of money invested in sovereign bonds is
enormous, and the events in both Argentina and Greece illustrate the
vulnerability of these investments. Low levels of protection cause
insecurities in the markets for foreign investments, and other sovereigns
feel the negative impact. In the absence of sovereign debt restructuring
regimes,162 arbitration promises to reestablish market confidence. In
light of that, it is neither helpful nor required to limit the scope of
arbitration within BITs to non-securitized forms of investment.
Therefore, in agreement with the majority in Abaclat, the issue of
whether sovereign bond debt qualifies as an investment should be
decided by interpreting the wording of the individual BIT.
2. The Greek BITs
Greece has entered into BITs with countries world-wide.163 Some
of these BITs define the term “investment” in a very similar way to the
Argentine-Italian treaty in the Abaclat decision. A randomly picked
BIT, such as that between Greece and Bosnia and Herzegovina, defines
“investment” as “[e]very kind of asset by an investor of one Contracting
Salini Construttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 50 (July 23, 2001), reprinted in 42 ILM 609, 621–22 (2003).
160. Joy Mining Mach. Ltd., 19 ICSID Rev. at 499.
161. Salini Costruttori S.p.A., 42 ILM at 622.
162. See discussion supra Part III.
163. See
Database
of
Bilateral
Investment
Treaties,
UNCTAD,
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx?id=779 (last visited May 20, 2013).
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Party invested in the territory of the other Contracting Party, and in
particular, though not exclusively includes . . . claims to money or any
performance having economic value, as well as loans connected to an
investment . . . .”164 An expropriation is deemed lawful in this BIT if it
takes place in the public interest, under due process of law, on a nondiscriminatory basis and against prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation.165
Similar provisions can be found in other BITs that Greece has
signed.166 If the Abaclat interpretation is applied to these BITs, it could
well follow that the investment in Greek sovereign bonds is protected by
the BITs and that Greece infringed upon its obligations regarding equal
treatment because the entire public sector—Greek and foreign—had
been spared by the latest restructuring.167 In any case, Greece would
owe prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. The Greek scenario
is comparable to the findings in Abaclat in that “[i]t may . . . constitute
an act of expropriation where the new regulations and/or laws deprive
an investor from the value of its investment or from the returns
thereof.”168
Another problematic matter is determining the amount of
compensation that would have to be granted to bondholders due to
expropriation. Are bondholders entitled to full compensation for the
principal and interest even if they purchased their bonds on secondary
markets and paid significantly less than what they would have bought
them for in the primary markets, or should this reduce their claims to the
market value of the bonds? If the market value is the appropriate
measure, how should it be determined?
Purchases in the secondary market are problematic for another
reason. Can they be considered investments in the territory of Greece
given that the purchase price may flow from one foreign investor to
another? This issue is not explicitly addressed in the Abaclat decision.
However, this line of argumentation helps. The tribunal emphasizes the
fact that in transactions involving intermediaries, the ultimate

164. Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, The
Helenic Republic-Bosn. & Herz., May 1, 2002, A: 1, 5.
165. Id.
166. See Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, UNCTAD, supra note 163.
167. On fair and equitable treatment, see, e.g., Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 257–68 (May 22, 2007); DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 140, at
814–15.
168. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, ¶ 314.
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beneficiary is the issuer of sovereign bonds.169 From this it can be
derived that transactions in the secondary market are a consequence of
the issuance of sovereign bonds and, therefore, indirectly benefit the
sovereign. Investors in the primary market may be willing to buy
sovereign bonds only because the bonds are transferable and, therefore,
tradable on secondary markets. A different line of argumentation might
simply posit that all secondary investors merely succeed into the legal
position that the primary purchaser acquired.
The amount of compensation depends on the approach taken. If the
rights of the bondholders are seen as derived from the primary
purchasers, compensation should cover the full amount promised by the
issuer at the time of the underwriting. The alternative approach, which
emphasizes the fact that every transfer of title is part of the bond scheme
approved by the issuer, would lead to the more satisfactory result that
compensation would have to reflect the market value of the bond. The
market value could be determined according to what can be considered a
recognized standard for BITs. The 2012 U.S. Model BIT provides that
the value of the investment is decided by the price paid prior to the act
of expropriation and may not reflect any change in value due to the fact
that the intended expropriation had become known earlier.170 This
corresponds to the findings of international arbitrators who applied
customary international law to determine the standard of compensation
for expropriation.171

169.
170.

See discussion supra Part II.A.1.c.
The 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty provides that “[t]he
compensation referred to in paragraph 1(c) shall . . . be equivalent to the fair market
value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took place
(“the date of expropriation”) [and] not reflect any change in value occurring because the
intended expropriation had become known earlier . . . .” 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral
Investment Treaty art. 6, Apr. 2012. See also World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment
of Foreign Direct Investment, in 2 WORLD BANK, LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE
TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1992), available at http://italaw.com/documents/
WorldBank.pdf; Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award,
¶ 122 (Aug. 30, 2000), 16 ICSID Rev. 168 (2001) (“[A]ny award to the claimant
should, as far as is possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and
reestablish the situation which would in all probability have existed if that act had not
been committed (the status quo ante).”).
171. See SEDCO, Inc. v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co., 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 180
(1986).

2013]

A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE EUROZONE CRISIS

563

3. New Challenges to Arbitration
With respect to BITs, there is a dimension to the intergovernmental financial facilities (EFSF and ESM) described above that
seems unique.172 The traditional wording of BITs seems ill-prepared for
the new approaches taken by the Euro zone governments. Generally
speaking, BITs include most favorable nation clauses as well as fair and
equitable treatment (“FET”) clauses. These clauses guarantee that all
investors will enjoy equal treatment, regardless of their nationality or
affiliation with the public or private sector. In the event of a sovereign
default, these clauses are designed to prevent investors from losses
resulting from the preferential treatment of a third party.173 The new
Euro zone financial facilities, however, create a category of investors for
which the BITs seem ill-prepared to deal with. The ESM claims
preferential creditor status,174 which is not unheard of. The IMF enjoys
this status, which is not explicitly granted by international law, but
exists due to customs and general recognition.175 However, with
increased emergency funding pouring into troubled Euro zone countries,
coupled with these investors enjoying preferred creditor status, it seems
that the BITs’ intent to guarantee investor protection in the situation of
sovereign default is challenged.
CONCLUSIONS
The financial aid provided to Euro zone member states infringes on
the “no bail out” clause in TFEU Article 125. Furthermore, the current
non-standard central bank measures have now been applied for more
than five years, and there are no signs to indicate that the central banks
would be able to terminate their non-standard commitments in the near
future. This raises the issue of whether such a broad commitment of the
central banks is compatible with its single mandate following from
TFEU Article 127. This article has also taken the position that the
purchase of sovereign bonds by the Euro system, unlimited in volume
and duration, is incompatible with the ban on monetary financing in
TFEU Article 123.

172.
173.
174.
175.

See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
See ALVAREZ, supra note 117, at 177–90.
See ESM Treaty, supra note 40.
On the preferred creditor status of the IMF, see ECB JULY BULLETIN, supra
note 40, at 80.
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These findings call for preventive mechanisms that provide for
instances of sovereign default. It is unfortunate that hardly any attempts
are made to establish a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism in the
EU. The imminent introduction of mandatory collective action clauses
in sovereign debt contracts of Euro zone member states will only
provide a solution limited to sovereign bond debt.
The first restructuring in the Euro zone took place in March of 2012
when Greece offered a voluntary exchange of its sovereign bonds,
simultaneously announcing that obstinate bondholders would be forced
to comply. This event is remarkable since the imminent legal issues
have yet to be addressed and could potentially lead to a number of
bondholder lawsuits against the Hellenic Republic. It has been argued
that an involuntary restructuring could not only be challenged in Greek
courts for infringements of the Greek constitution, but could also find its
way to arbitral tribunals for potential breaches of BIT clauses.

